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Introduction

almost any available metric, there is a wide gap
the economic
1
'-''"'"uu.., ... ifortunes of the Middle East and the West. Even after accountwhich
a small
of Middle HC>C"t"' ..."'"' ... "'
Westerners are on average about six times
They can also
to
on average, eight
years and have nearly twice the education (see Table 1.1). One cause - and consequence of Middle Eastern
economic retardation is poor governance and violence. The average
Easterner lives in a much more
and autocratic state and is subto much more civil
ethnic violence
the average Westerner.
is
the primary reason for the
tensions between
the Middle East and
of the rest
and it is at the root of the
Islamists.
Middle East - indeed, the West and
"'"' 1 ''"'°'~,-,,,u recent
In the
trial period, Western Europe was not obviously
of the rest of the
East that the Ottoman
and it was not so far ahead of the
HrY"''"'"'"' (the leading Middle Eastern state) felt economically or V'VU"~L~~u~
lnt".c>t'H'\"I" Over time, a vast
and "'""'""'"'~'"·mT
""1'">'1'"""'y"'" between the two. This
to dominate
the rest of the world economically and politically, a fact most clearly maniin their colonization of a large portion of the world's inhabitable land.
Meanwhile, by the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was considered
on its final legs. The leadthe "sick man of Europe" - a once mighty
Western European powers
carved up the Middle East into
states with artificial boundaries that suited
geopolitical
It is undeniable that the fortunes of the Middle East diverged
The difference in
from those of the West. But what caused this
fortunes is more puzzling than it might seem from a twenty-first-century
H"u-......"L...,
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Table 1.1 Economic and Political Health, the "West" and Middle East/North

Africa (MENA), 2012-2014 (weighted
The "West"

MENA

Per Capita GDP

$48,269

$8,009

Life Expectancy

80.4

72.6

Mean Years of
Schooling
State Fragility

12.l

6.8

1.42

11.11

0.00

1.03

0.00

3.58

Civil and Ethnic
Violence/War
Autocracy

Interpretation/Notes
In 2013 US
Dollars
2013 Life
Expectancy at
birth
2012 data
0--25
is most
fragile)
0-10 (10 is most
violent)
0-10 (10 is most
autocratic)

Sources: GDP World Bank (2014); Schooling- UN Development Program (2014); State Fragility,
Violence, Autocracy- Marshall and Cole (2014); Population CIA World Factbook (2014); all data
weighted by 2014 population; GDP and Fragility are in 2013; Violence and Autocracy are in 2014.
Western Europe includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United
and the United States.
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Morocco,
UAE, West Bank & Gaza, and Yemen.
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia,

For most of the last
or two, Westerners had more
contact with Middle Easterners than they did with the rest of the world.
between Western Europe and the Middle East
"''"'"''·UJ'"'"'" more
than it did between Western Europe and the
world. The similarities between the two regions and their relative
make the relative success of the West even more mysterious: What allowed Western economies to succeed where Middle Eastern
ones stagnated?
This is the question addressed in this book. At its core, this book is about
why some economies succeed and others stagnate. It is tempting to ask
whether Islam is to
for the relative poverty and poor governance of
the Middle East. It is
to avoid
question, even if it may be
a hypothesis because it
offensive to some; it is simply bad science to
is offensive. And
is reason not to dismiss this possibility offhand. The
famed scholar of Islamic history Bernard Lewis seemed to suggest just this
late in his career, 2 and there is a long Orientalist tradition ascribing bad

consequences to Islamic doctrine and practice. This is also a common trope
of the Western media,
associations between Islam and
"bad" socio-political-economic events are all too common. Even if most
stories in the media are easy to dismiss upon only slightly deeper
tion, it is not so easy to dismiss the more intelligently construed arguments
of the Orientalists. Lewis and others knew a lot about the Middle East and
Islamic history. And indeed, Islam harbors numerous rules relevant for
trade and governance.
why isn't Islam to blame? The answer is
even if one accepts
the idea that religious doctrine matters for economic performance, the facts
simply do not line up. The histories
in the millennium
to
to industrialization do not
with the
that Islam is
economic growth. The most important fact to account for in any theory
not the Middle
the modern economy was born in Western
the
East was ahead of Europe
East is
ically, and culturally for centuries following the
through twelfth centuries, Islamic ~....-.-...... ""'""' uv.uuual-<;.-u
Eurasia. For its first four or five centuries, Islam was ass-oc1tatE~ct
economic growth.
The uu-.-..1rinn1/1a U.l<>uivuuV-'-'centurieS ago than it is in the
economies. Western ,__,.,._L...,,,_,~
\;;\,,\JH\JU_1_,_..,a,_._.

populations were
and science
far
other regions.
almost any
economic measure, the
of
It had access to far more
Middle East was
technology, its trade flowed in higher volumes and over
it employed more
instruments. There
to
this assertion.
advances in mathematics,
philosophy, art,
were
of the
Islamic
through the thirteenth
The data are of course sparser
in the prethe
back in time one travels, but one indication
population size. Urban
modern setting for which we do have data is
population works as a metric
economic performance because
urban populations meant there was enough food to
people who
were not producing for
own sustenance, and urbanites generally prourban
duced and consumed the luxuries of life. In short,
3
tions generally meant
wealth.
Urban population data confirms the suspected
showing a slow
but clear reversal of economic fortunes between Western Europe and the
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800 C.E.

1300 C.E.

Q

Cities under Christian rule

Q

Cities under Christian rule

•

Cities under Muslim rule

•

Cities under Muslim rule

Figure 1.1 Twenty Most Populous Cities in Europe and the Middle East, 800 CE

1.2 Twenty Most Populous Cities in

and the Middle East, 1300 CE

Source: Bosker et al. (2013).

Source: Bosker et al. (2013).

Middle East over the last 1,200 years.
1.1 indicates that in 800, the
than
urban share of the population of the Islamic world was much
in Christian Europe. 4 Fourteen of the twenty-two largest cities in Europe
and the Middle East, including by far the largest city - the Abbasid capital Baghdad - were under Islamic rule. The Umayyad (Cordoba) Caliphate
in modern-day Spain and the Abbasid Caliphate, centered in modernday Iraq, ruled the most populous and wealthiest areas. Seven of the eight
most populous cities were Muslim-ruled, with only the Byzantine capital
Constantinople containing a large urban population of Christians. In fact,
the combined population of the top thirteen cities of Christian Western and
Central Europe (Naples, Rome, Verona, Regensburg, Metz, Paris, Speyer,
Mainz, Reims, Tours, Cologne, Trier, and Lyon) was less than the population of Baghdad in 800.
Fast forward 500 years. The scene described in the preceding paragraphs
certainly changed by 1300, but even so the Middle East was far from a laggard, in spite of the decimation of some urban populations by the Mongols.

in
Italy, and many
of Western
were well on their way to recovery.
1.2 sugthe balance of power between the Christian and Islamic worlds
was more equal, with twelve of the
cities ruled
Christians
·~~... ,,,,,~H the most populous
The center of Hnl'·nn,p-:in
was located in Italy - six of the twelve Christian cities were
of those located in the wealthy northern
and Florence, were among the wealthiest
especially Venice,
in the world, birthing many
of modern banking, Hii•~AA-'~'
accounting, and trade. Northwestern
was only slightly wealthier in
per capita terms in the early
than the wealthiest Muslim
of
(Egypt), while Italy was about twice as wealthy as any other
Western Europe, let alone the Middle East.
By 1800, the reversal of fortunes was
Seventeen of the
most populous cities in the region were not only Christian but located in
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1800 C.E.
0 Cities under Christian rule
•

Cities under Muslim rule

Figure 1.3 Twenty Most Populous Cities in

Source: Bosker et al. (2013).

and the Middle East, 1800 CE
in
1.1-1.4 are for rep resentaticmal
tilt in this map relative to its conventional repiresentaticm in
date the entire
Source: Bosker et al.
1

either Western or Central
The Industrial Revolution had commenced in Great Britain, and the European powers had colonized much of
the rest of the world. Real wages were much higher in northwestern Europe
than they were in the wealthiest
Muslim world. 6 The divergence
was not solely between northwestern
and the Middle East. By
time, real wages
between northwestern Europe and
China, Japan, and India as well.7
Figure 1.4 summarizes
trend in economic fortunes. This
presents the "urban center of gravity" of Western Eurasia
each century from 800 to 1800.
is a
metric of the average '"""'"'11,,,r1
and latitude of the
weighted by where urbanites lived. More populous areas "pulled" the center of gravity closer to themselves. The path
in this figure is
In 800, the urban center of Western Eurasia was
just west of the Anatolian Peninsula. It was pulled strongly to the southeast by the Abbasid Caliphate, which was centered in Iraq, while it was
pulled south by the bustling urban areas of Egypt. The primary reason

Europe is on a
to accommo-

Abbasid
was the presence of
...... ..,.~_..._, ....., in the Iberian Peninsula. Over
the
as the northern
tenth century, and ulti"'1"'hr.0"'"'Th centuries
grew relative
urban center of Western Eurasia
2,000 miles away
about 500-600 miles
Europe: London
of the reversal of fortunes must
it must account for both
rise

,,,...,..,., .. ~.,....,.,,,,." "'""~"'"'"'"T'".,._
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of the great Muslim empires as well as their relative stagnation. Second,
although it is not clear from Figures 1.1-1.4, the modern economy was very
much a product of northwestern Europe - England and, before that, the
Netherlands. An understanding of where modern wealth comes from must
therefore account for long-run differences both between Western Europe
and the Middle East and within Western Europe.
It is the purpose of this book to address these two issues within one consistent framework. The framework eschews simplistic notions that Islam
is at the root of the divergence or, on the contrary, that Catholicism or
Protestantism are causes of European success. It does argue, however, that
how political authorities used religion to legitimize their rule did matter,
and the exact mapping from religion to legitimacy to economic outcomes is
dependent on historical processes.
~AALIV_._

... ...,..,. .....

...,,Jl ... "'

and Limitations of the

The consequences of this "long divergence;' as Timur Kuran has called it,
are still with us in the twenty-first century.
were not for the temporary
shock of oil wealth, the Middle East would be one of the poorest places
on earth, rivaled only by sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Southeast Asia.
Historical curiosity should be enough to warrant an investigation into how
this region - once the wealthiest and most cultured region in the world fell so far behind.
But historical curiosity is not always enough. Historians and other intellectually minded individuals may appreciate the uncovering of historical
connections as ends in themselves, but others consider historical research
of this type worthwhile only if it sheds light on contemporary problems.
This book should satisfy such a reader. It is first and foremost a book of
economics. It uses economic theory to search for the general features of an
economy that yield success under some conditions and stagnation under
others. It uses Middle Eastern and Western European history as a testing
ground for the theory. History provides one of the best
grounds
for economic hypotheses: what happened is behind us, and the long-run
consequences are clear. This is certainly true of the long-run divergence
between Western Europe and the Middle East. One set of economies was
clearly much more successful than the other in the long run despite falling
well behind early on.
This book addresses this issue with a general economic argument.
When economists say that an insight is "general;' they tend to mean that it
applies to many situations, and the insight may predict different outcomes
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depending on the parameters involved. 1his book aims to
such a
insight into how and why economic success and ., . . "-!:'."·'-'"-U'-'"over
long periods. It should be obvious that this is not
concern for the Middle East and Western
the
made in
this book have implications for the difficult process of alleviating human
suffering associated with economic underdevelopment around the world.
After all, Western Europe was at one point an economic backwater, and the
average wealth of medieval Europeans was lower than most of the
parts of the world today. Understanding the mechanisms through which
Western Europe escaped such poverty- and the Middle
for the most
did not - clearly has implications for
possibilities and limits of
economic growth in the
developing world.
The history of the long-run
between Western Europe and the
rest of the world is therefore important to understand not
for the sake
historical interest, but because it has real
for how we view
the world and how we can
it.
the economic framework outin Chapter 2, this book delves into the historical
to
out what
worked in Western Europe and
did not work in the Middle East.
it never implies that merely
what worked in Western . .,,, ..,. . . .,,,.
into
Middle East will solve all its economic
the opposite is true; the solutions that
in Western Europe arose and evolved
in a
context.
this context is essential for . . . 0~c1.1.HJ.0J..LJ..L•F,
the limits of how previous
can inform the
Nor
this book imply that the Middle East is helpless to
its
fortunes. In fact, one of the
insights gathered from the book's
framework is that there are many forks
the path of a
economic, political, and institutional progression. Once a society takes one
along the fork, it becomes more difficult over time to revert to the other
side.
new forks arise all the
often for unanticipated or unforeseeable reasons such as new technologies or natural
How societies
'""'C'...,"·'"',, to these opportunities can have
consequences. But nothpredetermines how a society will
or when an
will
arise. History is not deterministic; we are not slaves to our historical and
institutional past.
This book also does not suggest that the type of economic success
that Western Europe experienced could have only happened
The
twentieth-century successes of South Korea and Taiwan are
evidence against such a claim. Instead, this book urges a more nuanced
view of why long-run economic success occurs,
for
features linked time and again to economic success.

10

Incentives
Economists like to think in terms of incentives. This book is no different. At
every historical turn, it asks the question: Why did the relevant parties act
in the manner they did? The answer given in this book always boils down
to: "They were incentivized to act in that manner:' Incentives come from a
host of societal attributes: politics, religion, social norms, laws, and culture
are just a few. The inquiry cannot stop there: simply noting the incentives
that individuals face is the last step. It is critical to take a step back and
ask: Why were those incentives there in the first place? Why do the incentives people face
in different places and at different times, and why
do they change over time? Why do they sometimes not change over time?
Thinking in terms
incentives means
ideas of
run economic
out of the window. Take, for
the idea
Middle East and Western
that the root of economic divergence between
nature" of Islam. 111is is no straw man
Europe lies in the
argument. A long tradition of Eurocentric explanations
the divergence
suggests that the
or "mystical" nature of Islam . . . . ..,,...,....,,.u
8
curiosity and
risk-taking, innovation, and
In
this view, Islam is
hostile to commerce and finance. Indeed, in
varying times
Muslim religious
advocated laws that
ae·ve1ovme~nt. such as
on taking interest and
of women, laws discouraging mass education, and
an1t10uat:ea inheritance and partnership laws. So, at a minibetween the presence of Islam and laws antito economic
But correlation is not causation. A simple economic example illustrates
.... L,_,, .............. u.~" relying on "inherent conservatism:' Consider
elderly
are less likely to use computing technoloL"''-JL.ta.i::;•.._ .. " are. On the surface, it may seem like older people are
inr1en~nLLV more conservative - they
sticking with writing letters over
senarntQ: e-mails.
however, is a too simplistic argument. Older people
are less likely to use advanced computing, not because they prefer the old
ways more than
do, but because the costs and benefits of learna new
are different. It may in fact be less costly in terms
for a seventy-year-old to become Internet proficient. Yet, a shorter
life horizon for the elderly not only means that they will enjoy the fruits of
learning to use
Internet for a shorter period of time, but the opportunity
costs associated with
time taken to learn new technologies are much
greater as well.
since their friends are much less likely to be on
"'U'-'U'-''CU
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the Internet, the benefits associated with
are also lower.
Hence, older people
take actions
lead to more conservative out-

comes, but this is not
J..LlC>~'-"W~)

a
the incentive structure is such that

have less incentive to

to economic
Chapter 2
a framework based on the incentives the relevant
face in the bargain
over laws and policies. It
the conditions that incentivize these players
laws and policies
respond to
economic environthese conditions are not presa changing
does not rely on some
certain
In the context of the
way of
is that conservatism is an outcome to be
cation of
it is not itself a cause of
evidence suggesting that Islamic
thought became more
conservative
sometime around the turn of
this does not mean
we
take the false
connecting a con correct UU•CC)L~V.LLO
servative
to economic C)La;:;:..i.ta.u•u.u • .1..u.a~-.. .... -~,
others and were
to
are
some cultures are more conservative
there incentives in
East which
outcomes. A
ences and
or IJVcLL~J.•vU..L•
from where?

Chapter 2 lays out the
framework of the book. It focuses on
in an economy who affect the
set
and policies: rulers
and their
One of its central ideas is that there are people or ornamzations in
due to their identity or access to resources, can help
stay in power. I call these
propagating agents. The framework
focuses on two types of propagating
coercive agents and . . . . h,_~ .....u,.~
ing agents. Coercive agents propagate through force follow the
because they face punishment
- while legitimizing agents
propagate through legitimacy - people follow the ruler because they believe
he (or, much more rarely, she) has the
to rule. Propagating
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agents can provide immense benefits to the ruler, but they also come at a
cost: the ruler gives them a seat at the bargaining table in return for their
support. The laws and policies resulting from this bargain are reflective of
the bargaining power of each player and their preferences.
Religious legitimation is especially attractive to rulers because it is inexpensive. Thus, rulers rely on religious authorities when those authorities
have the capacity to legitimize their rule. In such a world, rulers are loathe
to update laws in response to changing economic circumstances if doing
so would undermine the religious establishment. As a result, those with
the most to gain from modernizing a society's laws and policies - producers, merchants, and commercial farmers - have little incentive to push for
change. Not only are rulers unlikely to side against the religious establishment, but such a request is also a sin. Consequently, laws and policies do
not change in response to changes in the outside world, and the result is
economic stagnation. This logic indicates that conservatism is a result of
the incentives faced by the relevant players, not an ultimate cause of bad
economic outcomes.
The upshot is that differences in laws and policies across societies and
over. time within societies are a result of differences in the identities of propagatmg agents. These differences are themselves a result of differences in
one given
costs and benefits to rulers of using propagating agents. At
point in time, a society's institutions impose these costs and benefits on rulers. Institutions are those aspects of society that help form the "rules of the
game" by which all players abide. All societies have numerous types of instituti~ns - ~~ligious, political, social, and economic - all of which help shape
the game played between rulers and their propagating agents.
Chapter 3 brings the framework to the economic histories of Western
Europe and the Middle East, exploring the historical reasons that rulep.ropagating institutions were different in the two regions. It argues that the
circumstances surrounding the births ofislam and Christianity had important consequences for the manner in which rule was propagated. Islam was
born ~n the ~eventh-century Arabian Peninsula, and it formed as the early
Islamic empires were rapidly expanding. Many aspects of Islamic doctrine
w~re .a response to this environment, including doctrine supporting a rulers nght to rul~ as long as he acted "Islamic:' Christianity, on the other
hand, was born in the Roman Empire, with its previously established, wellfunctioning legal and political institutions. Early Christianity never formulated a corpus of legal or political theory that came close to rivaling that of
early Islam for the simple reason that early Christian thinkers did not need
to do so. This is not to say that religious legitimacy was unimportant in
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European history - it merely entails that Islam was more conducive to
mizing rule than Christianity was, meaning that the benefits of ...,..,.,,....,,,,,"
propagation were greater in the Middle East. than in Wes.te.rn
..
framework therefore predicts
all else bemg equal, rehg10us authorities
should have had a greater seat at the bargaining table in the Middle East
than in Western Europe.
It matters who sat at the bargaining table
two reasons: ( 1) doctrine
exists in both Islam and Christianity that affects economic practices; (2) the
interests of religious elites do not always align with the types of laws and
policies that favor economic success. Chapter 4 brings to light ~ne con~e
quence of this insight, overviewing the histo.ry of a~ ec~nomic doctnne
common to Islam and Christianity: laws agamst takmg mterest on loans
(usury). This chapter employs the framework to shed light on why usury
doctrine diverged in the two religions. It highlights the different ways that
political and religious authorities interacted in the t_w~ regions a~d how
this in turn affected the willingness of rulers to permit mterest. This
ter hardly claims that differences in interest laws were the reason Western
._,."""'"'""'"'-n economies surpassed the Middle East Yet, it does show that
these restrictions were not completely innocuous. The
of financial
instruments employed in the two
reflected doctrinal differences
and, more importantly, the lack
institutions in the Middle East
to the nineteenth century.
5 analyzes the
of the
sheds
on a historical
in Western Europe after its invention by Johannes
Ottomans prohibited its use for almost 250 years. The
for the different reactions to the press is straightforward. The printing press threatened the Ottoman religious establishment's monopoly on the transmission
of knowledge - a key source of their
in society they therefore had incentive to encourage the sultan to prohibit it. The sultan ohllI2:e:a
because religious authorities were important legitimizing agents, and permitting the press would have undermined them. Meanwhile, Christian rel~ gious leaders were in no position to ask
to block the press, and it
consequently spread rapidly throughout Europe.
.
analyses of interest and printing restrictions suggest there is
inherent in Islam that fosters an environment supporting anti-commerce
laws. In fact, early Islamic religious and
doctrines were quite flexible and possibly even growth promoting. Reinterpretation of religious law
was frequent as demanded by economic and social conditions, and as a
result the Middle East was an economic, technological, and cultural leader
.L•'-'•-.LH.L.L"'
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for centuries after the founding of Islam. Many of the Islamic laws that
eventually inhibited economic development were well suited to the needs
of the early Islamic economy.
as economic conditions advanced, the
legitimizing relationship between political and religious authorities had an
increasingly dampening effect on further economic development. Religious
doctrines such as those banning interest or reproducing words and images,
which were not a problem in the premodern economy, came to the fore as
an impediment to overcome.
The printing press was arguably the most important information technology of the last millennium, and Western European economies grew rapidly where it spread. But the indirect consequences of the spread of the
press were even more important. Chapter 6 highlights one of these conof
Protestant Reformation.
sequences: the press facilitated the
printing press permitted widespread, rapid dissent, allowing the
Reformation to succeed where previous anti-Church movements failed.
This chapter reports the results of empirical analyses that show that the
Reformation was much more likely to take hold in towns with access to
printed works. This is a classic case of a "fork" in a society's long-run institutional trajectory. Such an anticlerical movement, which was so dependent
on the rapid flow of information, was much less likely to happen in the
Ottoman Empire, where access to printed works was minimal. The lack of
information technology in the Ottoman Empire capable of quickly transmitting ideas allowed established interests to maintain their grip on power,
permitting the
status quo to hold for centuries. As a result,
religious authorities remained powerful political forces in the Middle East
for centuries after their influence waned in Western
The remainder of the book argues why the Reformation was such an
important event for the economic trajectory of Western Europe - and why
a lack of a similar undermining of religious authority was important for the
primary
trajectory of Catholic Europe and the Muslim Middle East.
insight is that the Reformation fundamentally transformed the manner in
which rule was propagated. The already weak legitimizing capacity of religion eroded further in Protestant states following the Reformation, forcing Protestant
to change the agents that propagated their rule. The
most common response was to seek propagation by the economic elites
who served in parlfaments. By economic elite I simply mean those people
primarily engaged in commerce: merchants, craftsmen, money changers,
engaged in either producing for marcommercial farmers, and anyone
ket or facilitating market transactions. The transition to propagation by the
economic elite was an important development, because their preferences
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tended to align more with those types of
that also portend ecoand public good
nomic success, such as secure property
Consequently, Protestant rulers more frequently enacted laws and ._,'-''''-'"'.l.'v"
favoring long-run economic success than did Catholic or Muslim rulers.
This is not to say that the economic elite were more "public
than other types of propagating agents and therefore desired policies in the
public interest due to altruistic motives. Quite the opposite, it suggests that
the economic elite pursued their own interests, which just so happened to
coincide with policies that benefited the broader economy. Nor is it to say
that everything the economic elite desired was good for the economy; history is
with examples of rent seeking by the economic elite.
is
also not to say that a political system run solely by the economic elite
be a good
an economy. It does imply,
that a ""'""''··"'""'~·
tern where the economic elite have a nontrivial seat at the bargaining
enables better economic outcomes than one
have no voice at all.
Chaot:ers 7 and 8 dig into the relevant histories to support these assereconomic and uv.uu·.... a..t
tions. Chapter 7 overviews the
ch2mg1es made in the two
Protestant economies: England and the
of one Catholic econ 8 overviews the
as well as
Eastern economy
·~~~·~+~.~ ..
'-'UUH.IU'--J.""',u.,

,.-n.,,,.,,.,.,,1r 1-~'"'"''""A'""'

economies

Islam, and some

accounts for the "little
that hap.U .... J.V'-''"' and the rest of
as well as the
and the Middle East. It is not
that eventusufficient to say
was
modern
economy
was
led to economic success.
much an English and
not a
framework "'r'"''""'""
Dutch Phi~no1me:no1
which
its
where the modern economy
was
a very
economy equilibrium by
end of the sixteenth ,..,..,....,,-t-,,...., - one that was more conducive to
economic growth.
notions '"''-'JLJ.H'-""~''J.J.l",
This framework thus turns simplistic
"Protestant ethic" to economic success on their head. 10 Max Weber
[2002]) argued that Calvinist
doctrine encouraged
ers to show that
were one of the "elect" by
and
-1-......
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worldly success. The "spirit of capitalism" thus pervaded the tTcne~na 1u
countries and placed them on a different economic path.
observation
that inspired this hypothesis is valid: many of the Protestant nations had a
head start on modern economic growth. But, while recognizing that there
is a correlation between Protestantism and economic success, this book
argues for a very different causal channel than one based on culture or religious tenets. It suggests that the changes in political economy brought on
by the Reformation - specifically the replacement of the religious elite with
the economic elite at the bargaining table - was the key feature connecting
Protestantism to economic success. This of course does not mean that the
modern economy had to emerge in Protestant northwestern Europe. It simply entails that if one living in 1600 had to choose which part of the world
industrialization and the associated explosion of economic growth would
commence 150 years hence, Protestant northwestern Europe would have
been a good choice. 11

Introduction
~ r•att1rnrt>C

faced by the key Middle Eastern and Western
political
The institutional changes analyzed by Greif were necessary precursors of the historical factors explored in this book. Greif's work therefore
provides a necessary complement to my
One set of institutional differences studied by Greif that deserve .._._,...,,_,H ....·H
attention are those related to family structure. The European family structure resulted from the policies of the medieval Church that .....i..,...,~ ·~L
certain practices in order to weaken kinship ties (adoption, polygamy,
remarriage, consanguineous marriage). According to Jack Goody (1983),
the Church imposed these policies in the
that people would donate
their property to the Church at their death rather than to their ldn.12 In
in the Middle
contrast, kinship ties were much more
~,_.,.,,,,..,...,.,.,"...,""11c marriage was commonplace.
(1994a, 2006a, 2006b)
argues that, as a result, European culture was more "individualistic" than
Eastern culture, which was more v'-i'Jl.Lv---u
institutions that created trust outside of the group, as the nuclear
13
was too small of a unit to engender
from
the Middle East when the scope of trade was
within the kin group could occur without
institutional aeve1opme~m:.
Howe'ver. impersonal exchange
on a wide scale once late medieval
l-in1·An,pcin communities established institutions that facilitated
the kin group.
are entirely consistent with
ones presented in this book. For one,
the same
for why Islam
may have been beneficial to economic
in the
context: it
of umma, which views the entire
connected Muslims through the
Islamic community as one. And Greif's
for the ultimate success
of the
economy nicely
my explanation.
kin
in the
ties may have ultimately discouraged
but this alone does not
why the economic elite were never able
to
a seat at the bargaining table. The argument presented in this book
fills in this gap, arguing that the economic elite never had a
at the bar,...,.,,,.., r, table because Middle Eastern rulers were strong
due to the
legitimizing capacity of Islam, to exclude them.
Another set of works from which the
and insight are Douglass North's works on
especially his books
Structure and Change in Economic History and Institutions, Institutional
Change, and Economic Performance. A
focus of North's works is
connecting political institutions to the expansion of
rights. The
emergence of such institutions in northwestern Europe were undoubtedly important, and they play a key role in the theory laid out in this book.
;
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Other Explanations
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The explanation proposed in this book for the "rise of the West" is far from
the only one out there. The rise of the West is one of the big issues that
economic historians tackle, and consequently
have been many words
dedicated to furthering our understanding of its causes. Many
existing hypotheses nicely complement the one proposed in
book. Such
explanations focus on other aspects of the rise of the West or relative stagnation elsewhere, providing explanations
reinforce the mechanisms
highlighted in this book. There are also explanations that are dearly contradictory to the ones proposed in this book. I also address these below and
indicate why I believe my explanation succeeds where those fail.
Complementary Hypotheses
The explanations for the "rise of the West" most closely related to the one
presented in this book are those proposed by Avner Greif, Douglass.North,
and Timur Kuran. Greif and North both provide useful frameworks for
understanding the economic implications of institutions. Greif shows in
a series of articles and his book, Institutions and the Path to the Modern
Economy, how decentralized institutions worked to facilitate trade in the
medieval period in the absence of centralized political and legal institutions. Greif focuses primarily on economic institutions that emerged outside of the state and how these institutions facilitated economic exchange.
The focus of the present book is on a different slice of economic life: the
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North extended his contributions to this literature in seminal article with
Barry Weingast (1989), which suggests that the imposition of institutionalized constraints on executive authority in England following the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 was the key turning point, since it gave an increased
political voice to wealth-holders. North, John Wallis, and Weingast extend
this argument even further in their book Violence and Social Orders, claim ing that opening access to impersonal and impartial legal and economic
institutions is the key to economic growth. In their view, open access is
important because it encourages a wider swath of the population to use
resources efficiently. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) make
that governa similar argument in their book Why Nations Fail,
ments that permit extraction are the primary historical
to ecoin
nomic growth. These
are all consistent with the one
this book. By and
this book takes the year 1600 as its stopping point.
One implication of my argument is that by 1600, there were certain parts
of Western Europe
were primed for an economic takeoff in the spirit
of what North and
describe. Hence, this book merely pushes their
arguments back a few centuries, noting why such events were more likely to
happen in
say, the Ottoman Empire.
The
employed in this book is similar to the important works of Timur Kuran. Kuran, in a series of papers and his book, The
argues that there were numerous
of Islamic law
stimulate commerce in the premodern economic environment
stifled economic progress as the environment
He employs a
similar tactic to the one used in this book, searching for an explanation
can
both
early Middle Eastern economies succeeded and
Western Europe eventually pulled ahead. Kuran primarily focuses on
demand - or
thereof - for legal change in Middle Eastern history,
focuses on its supply. 14 Our works are thus
neicessar·y ciompie:mt:~ms to each other; it is impossible to fully understand
a complete comprehension of the supply side, and
and North's works, Kuran and I ask the same big
parts of them.
Jan Luiten van Zanden employs the insights of Greif, Kuran, North, and
many others in his book, The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution. van
Zanden argues that one specific phenomenon - the "European Marriage
Pattern"
to the institutional formation that took place in early
and helped set it off from the rest of the world.
Specifically, van
suggests that the propensity of northwestern
European men and women to get married later in life encouraged them to
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acquire more human capital, which was an important determinant of how
institutions evolved. 15 Like Greif, van Zanden argues for the importance of
decentralized institutional developments in the economic rise
in
the late medieval period (950-1350). Without such developments, many
of
processes discussed in this book could not have occurred. Like the
of the printing press
present book, van Zanden also stresses the
and the Reformation, although he is more concerned with their human captheir effects on politics.
ital consequences and I am more concerned
Another set of hypotheses focusing on political and legal institutions
argues that :fiscal and legal capacity - the power to tax and provide law played an important role in the rise of the West. This
in its recent
to Charles Tilly
1990 ), who argues that the need
form can be
for mutual defense and war
incentives for
to invest in
revenue
Tilly's
statement is "War made
the state,
the state made
true that the
of :fiscal, legal, and state
role in the growth
of states and economic fortunes. 17
one
of this literature
is that it assumes the existence of a ruler who can choose to expand tax
into
collection efforts or legal jurisdiction
to do so in the first
the ruler has the
"'-'-'l-JLU.v•...,_) any
of ruler is a
to start in most
settmLQS.
an:unru~1u laid out in this book smrge:sts
,_H..,LVJ. Jl'-'U-A

their
to reap the
Although I only
indirectly discuss investments in fiscal capacity in relation to rule propa7 and
it
follows that the two are intimately
gation (in
~

~~ryd

focuses on the fact that
was
into small
states that were frequently at war, whereas much of the rest of the world
large
that
less political competition. The
was dominated
main idea in this literature, formulated by Paul M. Kennedy (1987) in The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, is that the constant
for
in Europe created incentives to improve military technology at a different
rate than the rest of the world, which in turn gave Europe the upper hand
in colonizing starting in the
century. A more
version of
this hypothesis,
forward by Philip Hoffman (2015) in his book
Did Europe Conquer the World?, argues that
between...,,,..,..,..,...,,,.....,
rulers only led to massive improvements in military technology when
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combined with gunpowder, which came to Europe in the late medieval
period. 19 Yet, one of the key insights in the present book is that the Middle
East ultimately suffered precisely because their rulers were strong: the
strength of their rule, due in part to religious legitimation, permitted them
to grow empires without having to negotiate with the economic elite. The
opposite was the case in Europe, where rulers were relatively weak due in
part to low levels of religious legitimation. This argument complements the
fractionalization literature because it provides an explanation for Europe's
fractionalization. 20 Indeed, it goes beyond this literature by providing an
account for intra-European differences in long-run economic outcomes.
The modern economy was born in northwestern Europe, not just Europe.
This fact is difficult to account for in an argument based solely on European
fractionalization.
A different set of hypotheses focus on the economic effects of rhetoric,
intellectualism, and the Enlightenment. A compelling example from this
literature is Deirdre McCloskey's Bourgeois Dignity, which suggests that the
way people talked mattered. In particular, a shift in language, particularly in
England and the Netherlands, more favorable to commerce and trade was
instrumental in changing mindsets and encouraging talented and wealthy
individuals to pursue commercial activities previously considered base. Joel
Mokyr (2002, 2009) presents a complementary argument, suggesting that
new ways of thinking and acquiring knowledge, particularly in association
with the seventeenth-eighteenth century
the
economic behavior of producers and entrepreneurs in favor
ing toward more efficient techniques. Both McCloskey and Mokyr dearly
point out important aspects of the growth of the modern economy; it is
difficult to imagine a modern economy in which an inquisitive and experimental impulse was lacking in business or those engaging in commerce
were pariahs.
it is unclear what the prime mover is in these arguments.
Could it possibly be true that a change in attitudes toward merchants
occurred without a concurrent rise in the power or wealth of these classes?
Is it not possible that the Enlightenment and other intellectual movements
were responses to economic or political conditions? The arguments made
in the present book help shed light on these problems by providing insight
into the conditions that made such movements possible in the first place.
Contradictory Hypotheses
The most important set of contradictory hypotheses to the one proposed
in this book centers around differences in culture. I already stated the primary problems with explanations based on culture - they often confuse
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correlation with causation, suggesting that a "conservative" culture is
the cause of the problem when it is actually a result of
forces also
affecting economic and political differences. Of course, culture matters
to economic outcomes.
hypotheses of this ilk tend to treat culture as
unchanging. An important example of such an argument yet
comes
from Max Weber (1922), who famously ascribed the relative economic
retardation of the Middle East to the "conservative nature" of Islam. Such
a claim was seconded in more recent expansive histories by David Landes
(1998, ch. 24), Eric Jones (1981, pp. 179-84), and even Joel Mokyr (1990,
pp. 205-6), who in a fantastic book on technology and economic development suggests that a shift to a more conservative outlook contributed to
the long-run technological backwardness of the Middle East. 21 The
book
an alternative
conservatism is not an iiii~~i ·~ii~
feature of a society, but an outcome based on a lack of incentive to ...,uv•.1..•;;'-'·
_,.,,,,...,."'." Clark's meticulously researched A Farewell to Alms
a
strand of cultural
Clark offers the
that noble
middle-class values slowly
throughout English society
the late medieval and early modern
because the rich had
"""'r'"""'ri111·nr•n rates than did the poor, and this
the world. As people with a more bourgeois .,~~-n~· .,~..i~
out all
of the economy, virtues
associated with '"'"..,, . . .,u.u.:u.J.J.
with them, allowing England to escape the Malthusian
of persistent subsistence income. In Clark's
institutions
no role in the
that has sparKe'.a
rise of modern wealth. It is a
,,,..,. .... ,..,.,..,.,...,_,,_ debate about the "big ow.:~snion
others are poor. 23
it does not
address one
of the argument: the onset of modern economic growth was a
ern European phenomenon. Clark's
applies to ..._,u;;.iu...........
the rest of Western Europe, and it cannot
the clear differences that
arose by 17 50 between the Ottoman
and northwestern Europe, not
r·hi-i-L>Y.C>fti-
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Another explanation, more prevalent in the popular press than in acais that Western colonialism is the cause of Middle Eastern ecoview, the nineteenth- and
nomic stagnation and political violence. In
and the Middle East
twentieth-century plundering of North
European powers inhibited the region's economic development. The most
popular variant of this argument is that the carving up of the Middle East
under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 without regard to tribal, ethor religious identities set the stage for internal conflicts from which
the region has yet to escape. 25 This is an attractive idea to those who want
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to absolve Middle Eastern political, religious, and economic leaders
contributing to economic stagnation. While it is certainly true that the
European powers did not have the best interests of Middle Easterners at
heart - and that many aspects of twentieth-century Middle Eastern political economy have colonial roots - it is hard to see how colonialism is the
root source of Middle Eastern problems. Such explanations raise a more
important question than they answer (also noted by Timur Kuran): Why
were Western European powers able to colonize the Middle East in the first
place? Colonization cannot be the root cause of economic differences, but
instead must be an outcome of other, more historically distant economic or
political causes.
Another hypothesis that cannot explain many of the phenomena disforward
cussed in this book is Jared Diamond's "geography hypothesis"
in Guns, Germs, and Steel. Diamond claims that the shape ofland masses, the
ability to domesticate certain animals, and crop endowment had numerous
consequences for how societies formed over time. Likewise, Jeffrey Sachs
(2001) argues that disease environment, ability to produce food, and energy
endowments help explain why tropical climates have performed worse than
temperate ones. A related set of hypotheses are those of Stanley Engerman
and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997, 2000), who argue that resource endowments
helped shape the economic paths of different regions in the New World. If
geography is the
of long-run economic success, it is
difficult to see
some
of the world could be so far ahead at one
all, geography is practipoint in time and then fall so far behind later.
cally constant. The geography thesis therefore has difficulty answering the
primary question posed in this book: Why was the Middle East so
ahead
of Western Europe for so long only to ultimately fall so far behind?26
A final argument meriting discussion is the one proposed by Bernard
Lewis late in his career in What Went Wrong? Lewis argues that the lack
of separation of church and state in
Islamic world had a
detrimental effect on Islamic economies. This fact is also at the heart of the
argument in the present book, although the conclusions drawn from it are
very different than in Lewis. Lewis argues that there was never a separation
of church and state in Islam due to the fact that Muhammad conquered
his holy land in his lifetime and became the head of the first Muslim state.
Consequently, the concept of "secularism" remained foreign and unthinkable in the Islamic lands. Lewis goes on to argue that this meant that societal
features associated with secularism in the West - civil society and representative government - never evolved in the Islamic world. Lewis's argument is a bit too simplistic. Why should a concept be unthinkable for more
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than one thousand years
because it was not a
of early Islamic
doctrine? Both the religion of Islam and the
structure of Middle
Eastern states changed on numerous fronts in the last 1,400 years, especially
nothing inherent to
in the first four Islamic centuries. There is
Islam that would forbid change in the manner that Lewis implies. The present book provides an answer where Lewis is lacking one. Instead of simply
assuming that differences in how rulers used Christianity and Islam were
"built into" the system, it provides an explanation for why the legitimizing
relationship between rulers and religious authorities diverged over time.
Unlike Lewis, my explanation does not rely on a Eurocentric assumption of
the "Orient" merely being stuck in its ways.
I argue that where we
do not see change it is not because of some inherent conservatism or alter"unthinkable;' but because it was in the interests
of
to maintain the status quo.
a Caveat
This book
insight into the statement made in its subtitle:
West
rich and the Middle East did not. It tackles the
of
modern wealth came
and
West and

wealth is a
economists and economic historians. Political scientists are interested in the
role that rulers and political institutions played in
process that
the modern economy. I also
to
but false claims
about the
connections between
outcomes. To the extent that

I avoid using ecowith words.
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Whenever an economist writes for a
it is difficult
to avoid writing in a manner that prevents misinterpretation. This is
even truer when writing on religion, a topic in which many people have
preconceived notions on what they want the answer to be. I attempt to
preempt any such misinterpretation throughout the book, wherever it
is appropriate, and I re-address the major misconceptions of the argument in the concluding chapter. But there is one misconception worthy
of addressing at the end of this introductory chapter. This is, namely, that
this book is very much not a diatribe against religion. Nor is it a diatribe
against Islam. It is true that this book seeks an explanation for why the
Middle East fell behind Western Europe, and that it finds "getting religion out of politics" to have played a major role in this process. But there
is almost nothing about Islam or Christianity per se that is at the root
of these differences, save their capacity to legitimize rule. Nor is there
anything specific to religion that is "bad" for economic outcomes: propagation by any entity with interests not aligned with broader economic
success will likely lead to laws and policies detrimental to long-run economic fortunes. More importantly, while this book tackles a controversial topic, it does so with no underlying agenda besides being a quality
work of economics. It is not pro- or anti-Islam or pro- or anti-religion.
It is simply an argument that uses economic logic to improve our understanding of the origins of the modern economy and why it
and did not emerge - when and where it did.
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